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Abstract 
Children exposed to pollutants like lead are more disruptive and have lower achievement. 
However, little is known about whether lead-exposed children affect the long-run outcomes of 
their peers. We estimate these spillover effects using new data on preschool blood lead levels 
(BLLs) matched to education data for all students in North Carolina public schools. We compare 
siblings whose school-grade cohorts differ in the proportion of children with elevated BLLs, 
holding constant school and peers’ demographics. Having more lead-exposed peers is associated 
with lower high-school graduation and SAT-taking rates and increased suspensions and absences. 
Peer effects are larger for same-gendered students. 
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I. Introduction 
A growing literature shows that early life exposure to pollution hinders 
health and human capital accumulation (Persico, Figlio, and Roth 2020; Alexander 
and Currie 2017). For example, lead poisoned children are more likely to be 
suspended and commit crimes (Aizer and Currie 2019; Reyes 2015) and have worse 
academic achievement (Ferrie, Rolf, and Troesken 2012; Grönqvist, Nilsson, and 
Robling 2020; Hollingsworth et al. 2020), consistent with lead’s impacts on 
children’s neurological development. These associations manifest at blood lead 
levels (BLLs) as low as 1–2 micrograms per deciliter (µg/dL) of blood (Aizer et al. 
2018; Feigenbaum and Mueller 2016). Lead may also affect children’s disability 
status (Gazze 2016). These negative effects of lead exposure are costly to children, 
families, and society in terms of reduced tax revenues and increased expenditure 
on special education, crime, and health care (Reyes 2014). Recent estimates suggest 
that at least 500,000 young children are still poisoned by lead each year in the US 
(Aizer et al. 2018). 1 Low-income children are up to 12 times more likely to have 
elevated BLLs (CDC 2005), and Black children are more than twice as likely to be 
lead poisoned than their White peers (CDC 2005). 
So far, the literature has focused on estimating the effects of pollution and 
lead poisoning on directly exposed children. However, these children interact daily 
with peers. Because children exposed to lead are more disruptive, have lower 
achievement, and engage in risky behavior, the effects of lead exposure might spill 
over to affect everyone in the classroom. While these spillovers may have long term 
consequences for students, few papers credibly document the long-run impacts of 
childhood peers. In this paper, we document these spillover effects of lead 
 
1 In this paper, we use the words lead poisoning and lead exposure interchangeably. We follow the 
CDC guidelines and define lead poisoning/elevated BLLs as BLLs above 5ug/dL. 
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poisoning on children who are not directly exposed to lead, but are exposed to lead 
poisoned school peers.  
In addition to considering the impacts of lead, a growing literature shows 
that various types of common pollution exposure (from highways, toxic sites, etc.) 
cause worse performance on exams and behavioral issues associated with 
suspensions from school (Heissel, Simon, and Persico 2021; Persico and Venator 
2021). If one child’s exposure to pollution causes negative long run spillover effects 
onto his peers, this increases the true costs of pollution and changes our 
understanding of how pollution might affect long run human capital attainment. 
When considering how common it is for low-income children to be exposed to 
pollution sources, the finding that there are spillovers from pollution exposure 
means that most children and public schools in the U.S. likely bear some of the cost 
of pollution. Our data indicate that in North Carolina public schools between 2000 
and 2017, 98.9 percent of middle school students without known lead exposure had 
at least one lead poisoned child in their school cohort, 79.9 percent were in a school 
cohort with at least 5 percent lead poisoned peers and 52.5 percent were in a school 
cohort with at least 10 percent lead poisoned peers.2 Thus, the spillover effects of 
lead exposure are a heretofore unexplored mechanism through which social 
context, pollution, and built environment could affect schools and children’s 
outcomes.  
Rigorously estimating peer effects is challenging because peers influence 
each other simultaneously, so it is unclear whether a disruptive child causes their 
classmates to misbehave, or whether the classmates cause them to be disruptive 
(i.e., the reflection problem). In addition, peer groups are not randomly assigned; 
 
2 National Childhood Blood Lead Surveillance Data from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention suggest that lead exposure might be even more pervasive in the rest of the US. Indeed, 
while the share of children tested for lead poisoning in North Carolina between 2012 and 2017 was 
similar to the national average, the percent of NC children with BLLs above 5ug/dL was 0.4-0.7% 
compared to 2-3% in the US overall. 
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they are selected based in part on unobserved characteristics (i.e., the selection 
problem). We overcome these identification challenges by using a novel data set 
and rigorous identification strategy. We use rich education data from public schools 
in North Carolina linked to data on children’s BLLs measured by age six and 
compare siblings whose cohorts happen to randomly differ in the proportion of 
children with high preschool BLLs in their grade-cohort in the same school. Our 
preferred specification includes family, school, grade, birth month, birth order, and 
year fixed effects, and controls for a broad set of time varying child and cohort 
demographic characteristics, as well as school quality. Since lead poisoning has 
been linked to behavioral incidents, criminality, and lower test scores, we use it as 
a proxy for peers with potentially disruptive behavior and lower academic 
achievement. This methodology avoids the reflection problem because a child 
cannot affect the BLLs of their peers, but lead poisoning might affect children 
negatively, which in turn might affect peers. Including family fixed effects 
mitigates the selection problem by controlling for unobserved family characteristics 
that could be correlated with both peers’ quality and a child’s outcomes, such as 
selection into schools with fewer lead poisoned children. Controlling for peers’ race 
and socioeconomic status suggests that our estimated effects are due to lead 
poisoning and not peer demographics.  
We find that a ten percent increase in the share of peers in a child’s cohort 
that are exposed to lead is associated with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the 
likelihood of suspension from school, a 1.6 percent increase. A ten percent increase 
in the share of peers in a cohort exposed to lead is also associated with a 1.7 
percentage point decrease in the likelihood that a child graduates high school, a 2 
percent decrease in the graduation rate. We also find that having more lead-exposed 
children in a child’s cohort is associated with a higher likelihood of chronic 
absenteeism and dropping out of school, and a decrease in the likelihood of taking 
the SAT. Disruptive peers disproportionally affect the outcomes of Black students, 
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suggesting that the spillover effects of pollution could be contributing to persistent 
inequality in human capital accumulation. These findings generally hold in samples 
limited to locations where we measure lead exposure and sibling matches less 
noisily, and where students are less likely to switch schools in response to 
disruptive peers. Our results are also largely robust to further testing for school-
switching directly and by including sibling-by-school fixed effects.  
We also find that disruptive peers disproportionally affect same-gendered 
and, in the short run, same-race students. Furthermore, we find that students going 
to school with a higher share of lead-exposed peers are more likely to be involved 
in behavioral incidents with these disruptive students. Finally, exposure to 
disruptive peers in middle school, rather than elementary school, appears to drive 
long-run outcomes. We interpret our results as suggestive that homophily in 
network formation might drive the spillover effects of lead poisoning through peers 
influencing each other to engage in similar disruptive behavior. 
This paper makes three main contributions. First, this is the first study to 
investigate the spillover effects of lead exposure on peers’ academic achievement, 
behavior, and long-run outcomes. By exploiting rich individual-level data, we 
assess the costs of the spillover effects of lead exposure. Furthermore, our findings 
have implications for more than just lead: our estimates imply that the true costs of 
pollution are likely higher than the direct costs alone, especially for pollutants that 
are known to affect behavior and suspensions from school.  
Second, this is among the first studies to examine the long-run impacts of 
disruptive peers, as well as the channels through which these effects manifest. 
Current evidence on the long-run effects of peers is mixed. While Carrell, Hoekstra, 
and Kuka (2018) show that having peers exposed to domestic violence lowers 
wages and educational attainment, Bietenbeck (2020) finds positive long-run 
effects from peers who repeat kindergarten. We show that exposure to lead 
poisoned peers can have long term consequences, including dropping out of high 
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school, even for those children who were not themselves exposed to lead. We also 
find suggestive evidence on the mechanisms – that homophily within groups and 
exposure to disruptive peers in middle school might drive some of these effects 
through the development of noncognitive skills. In particular, our robust results on 
suspensions and chronic absenteeism strengthen the suggestive evidence provided 
by Carrell, Hoekstra, and Kuka (2018) that noncognitive skills are a mechanism 
through which disruptive peers affect long-term outcomes.  
Third, we contribute to a growing literature documenting the importance of 
neighborhood effects for health, education, and behavior outcomes. Our findings 
on the long-term effects of exposure to lead poisoned children might help explain 
why high-poverty and high-pollution neighborhoods have persistent effects 
(Chetty, Hendren, and Katz 2016). Low-income children are more likely to live 
near sources of toxic waste (Persico, Figlio, and Roth 2020; Banzhaf, Ma, and 
Timmins 2019), and neighborhood characteristics contribute significantly to health 
disparities, for example in asthma rates (Alexander and Currie 2017). Our paper 
presents another channel through which inequalities in prevalence of pollutants at 
the neighborhood level contribute to the persistence of inequality in the US.  
II. Background 
Lead Exposure 
Ingestion or inhalation of lead causes lead poisoning, which, if severe, can 
induce widespread brain damage (Meyer, McGeehin, and Falk 2003). Small 
children are especially exposed to lead-contaminated soil and dust from paint due 
to normal hand-to-mouth activity. Moreover, lead is most damaging to small 
children: they absorb and retain more lead than adults and their neurological 
development is particularly susceptible to neurotoxins (Meyer, McGeehin, and Falk 
2003). Specifically, lead causes the axons of nerve cells to degenerate and lose their 
myelin coats (Meyer, McGreehin and Falk, 2003). Early life exposure to lead has 
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been shown to cause cognitive disabilities, lower test scores, increase suspensions 
from school, and even affect crime and wages in adulthood (Persico, Figlio, and 
Roth 2020; Gazze 2016; Grönqvist, Nilsson, and Robling 2020). Lead has also been 
associated with problems in cognition, executive functioning, abnormal social 
behavior (including aggression), and fine motor control (Cecil et al. 2008). Reyes 
(2014) estimates that lead poisoning costs $200 billion for a single birth-year 
cohort. 
Peer Effects in the Classroom 
Peer effects can work through different channels, both positively and 
negatively. Children teaching each other is an example of a positive peer effect, 
while disruptive behavior can negatively affect the learning of all children in a 
classroom (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010; Figlio 2007; Hoxby 2000; Lazear 2001). 
Using the random assignment of roommates in college, Sacerdote (2001) finds that 
roommates can influence college grade point averages positively or negatively. A 
variety of mechanisms link peer composition and academic outcomes, including 
differential curricular offerings and instructional practices in classes with higher 
average ability (Jackson 2013); social dynamics in a student’s reference group 
(Hoxby 2000; Brenøe and Zölitz 2020); and low performing students not keeping 
up with higher-achieving peers (Imberman, Kugler, and Sacerdote 2012). Peers 
might also draw disproportionately on a teacher’s time and influence class culture 
and standards.  
One strand of the literature examines how low-performing and disruptive 
children affect peers. Having more low achieving peers or peers with learning 
disabilities is associated with lower achievement (Hoxby 2000; Fletcher 2010). 
Moreover, boys with feminine sounding names and children exposed to domestic 
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violence are both more likely to be disruptive and negatively affect peers’ 
achievement and behavior (Figlio 2007; Carrell and Hoekstra 2010).3 
Less is known about the long-term impacts of disruptive peers or the 
mechanisms through which disruptive peers affect long-run outcomes. Carrell, 
Hoekstra, and Kuka (2018) find that having more disruptive peers in elementary 
school leads to lower earnings in adulthood and lower college attendance. Bifulco, 
Fletcher, and Ross (2011) find that a higher percentage of high school classmates 
with college-educated mothers increases school completion and college attendance. 
Bobonis and Finan (2009) find that the PROGRESA program in Mexico increased 
college attendance of non-eligible peers. Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2013) 
find that a higher share of girls in ninth grade reduces educational attainment and 
the likelihood of selecting an academic track for college but lowers teen birth rates.4 
By contrast, Anelli and Peri (2019) find that peers’ gender in high school does not 
affect college major choice, college performance, or income in Italy.   
In this paper, we show that children who were exposed to lead are associated 
with both short- and long-run negative outcomes for their peers. We provide fresh 
evidence on the spillover effects of lead, the long-run effects of having disruptive 
peers, and the mechanisms through which peers affect long-run outcomes. 
III. Data Description 
Education Data 
We use 1997-2017 population-level data on every child attending public 
school in North Carolina, including charter schools, linked to blood lead test 
records when available. These unique data include home address identifiers that 
 
3 There are many excellent papers on short run peer effects. See Epple and Romano (2011) and 
Sacerdote (2011) for overviews of the literature on peer effects. 
4 Relatedly, Balestra, Eugster, and Liebert (2020) find that having peers with special needs lowers 
performance, the probability of entering post-compulsory education, and income.  
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enable us to match siblings. To our knowledge, this is the first state-level data set 
linking individual BLLs to schooling records that allow the matching of siblings 
and students to classrooms. The data also include detailed information on students’ 
race and economic disadvantage status in a given year, annual standardized test 
scores administered by the state, suspensions, absences, high school dropout and 
completion information, college intentions, as well as teacher characteristics.  
While we use the entire sample to calculate the number of children per 
school-grade-year cohort who have elevated BLLs (as well as all of our cohort 
controls), for our main analysis we drop children who do not have siblings, as well 
as children who live in large buildings since we cannot reliably identify families in 
those buildings. In Section V, we show how omitting sibling fixed effects and using 
the whole sample affects our estimates and we test for whether error in sibling 
matches affects the results. Our main analysis also drops students who themselves 
have an elevated BLL and estimates the spillover effects of lead exposure on 
children without known lead poisoning. The Data Appendix provides more 
information on the linkage performed by the North Carolina Education Research 
Data Center (NCERDC) and our sibling identification algorithm.  
For our contemporaneous outcomes, we use the average of standardized 
mathematics and reading end-of-grade (EOG) test scores administered in grades 3-
8, indicators for being absent for more than 21 days,5 and having at least one out-
of-school (OOS) suspension,6 as well as the number of days the child was 
suspended out-of-school each year in grades 6-12. We also construct indicators for 
being suspended on the same day and for being involved in a behavioral incident 
with a lead-exposed cohort peer. Because EOG exams and exam scales changed 
 
5 The data break down absences into 0-7, 8-14, 15-21, and more than 21 days. We focus on the last 
bin as an indicator of chronic absenteeism.  
6 We focus on OOS suspensions because the reporting requirements for these did not change 
during the sample period, while in-school suspension reporting became more stringent over time. 
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multiple times over the sample period, we limit our analysis to exams taken 
between 1996-1997 and 2004-2005, which were administered to all children and 
had a similar structure.7  
For our long-term outcomes, we use indicators for high school graduation, 
dropping out,8 community and four-year college intentions in 12th grade, and 
whether the student took the SAT in high school. The Data Appendix provides more 
details on the construction of our outcome variables.  
We construct various individual, cohort, and time-varying school 
covariates. Individual-level covariates include indicators for gender, race, being 
economically disadvantaged in a year, having a blood lead level test, birth month, 
and birth order. Our cohort level covariates include the share of cohort peers that 
are non-white, economically disadvantaged, and tested for lead. The school-year 
covariates include the share of teachers with a Master’s degree, school size, and the 
stability rate which is defined as the percentage of students from the October 
membership count who are still present in the second semester (90 days later). 
 
Blood Lead Levels Data  
 We obtained individual blood lead test records for children up to age six 
from the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services for the years 
1992-2016. Test records include the date of blood draw, test result in µg/dL, and 
the child’s identifier. We define a child as having an elevated BLL (EBLL) if their 
 
7 During our sample period, the scale for the math EOG exam changed in 2001-2002. The reading 
EOG exam scale changed in 2002-2003. 
8 The data include separate variables for dropping out and graduating. Dropping out of school is 
distinct from school switching, death, moving, promotion, graduation, and other confounding 
factors, and specific reason codes are given for dropping out. If a student is ever observed as 
graduating, we count them as graduating and not dropping out. 
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highest BLL is ≥5 µg/dL, the upper reference interval value per the 2012 guidelines 
by the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 2013).9 
Childhood lead screening is not mandatory in North Carolina. However, 
federal guidelines mandate that all children on Medicaid are screened for lead 
poisoning at ages one and two. Thus, we expect screening to be higher among low-
income children, who have a higher likelihood of lead exposure. We construct 
indicators for children missing blood lead tests and include these children in our 
analysis. We compute the share of a child’s peers with EBLLs using all children in 
the cohort or classroom as the denominator, independently of whether they have a 
blood lead test. Figure 1 plots the share of children with blood tests and the share 
of children with EBLLs by birth cohort in our sample, showing that as lead 
screening increases over time, the incidence of lead poisoning decreases. Despite 
this secular trend, Appendix Figure A1 shows that first-born children have only 1.5 
percentage points more lead-exposed peers than their younger siblings, suggesting 
that our identification strategy is not likely to be driven by differences in outcomes 
between older and younger siblings. Given the large literature on birth order 
showing that earlier-born siblings typically have better outcomes (see, e.g., Black 
et al., 2005; Conley and Glauber, 2006; Price, 2008; and Booth and Kee, 2009), it 
is unlikely that birth order effects would be driving our results since this would 
require that later-born siblings would have better outcomes than earlier-born 
siblings. Moreover, in our regressions on the siblings sample we control for birth 
order fixed effects. 
Sample Description 
 
9 This value is the 97.5th percentile of BLLs in U.S. children aged 1–5 years from the combined 
2007–2008 and 2009–2010 cycles of the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey. 
Starting in 1991 and prior to 2012, CDC defined BLLs ≥10 µg/dL as the "level of concern" for 
children aged 1–5 years. In robustness checks, we define a child as having an elevated BLL if 
alternatively the mean of their BLLs is ≥5 µg/dL or their highest BLL is ≥10 µg/dL. 
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Since our blood lead level data begin in 1992 and include children tested up 
to age 6, we restrict our sample to children born after 1986. Table 1 presents 
summary statistics for the sample of all children attending public schools in North 
Carolina (3.3 million children, Column 1) and our analysis sample of siblings (1.3 
million children, Column 2). The Data Appendix details our sample selection 
criteria. 39.6 percent of children in our analysis sample have a blood lead test, and 
10.9 percent have at least one test greater or equal than 5 µg/dL, slightly higher 
shares than in the full sample in Column 1. Children in our sibling sample are also 
marginally more likely to be economically disadvantaged, less likely to be Black, 
attend schools with slightly larger cohorts but have slightly more teachers with a 
Master’s degree, and have slightly better outcomes. Overall, children with siblings 
are fairly similar to the full sample, and our results are very similar when we include 
all children in a model using school-grade and grade-year fixed effects, which lends 
support to the external validity of our results.  
Children with EBLLs are more likely to be Black, be economically 
disadvantaged (ED) as measured by an indicator for having ever received free or 
reduced-price lunch, and have teachers without Master’s degrees (Columns 4 and 
5). The average cohort in our sample includes 225 children. Children who spend at 
least one elementary school year in a cohort with above median share of lead-
exposed children (or >10.1 percent of cohort peers) have lower test scores, higher 
suspension rates, lower graduation and SAT taking rates, and have a lower 
probability of intending to attend a four-year college (Columns 6 and 7). These 
children are also more likely to be Black, be economically disadvantaged, have 
teachers without Master’s degrees, and have a blood lead test themselves. Our 
identification strategy controls for family background with family fixed effects, 
assuaging concerns of omitted variable bias due to these differences. 
13 
IV.  Identification Strategy 
Rigorously estimating peer effects has proven difficult methodologically 
and due to limitations of existing data. First, peers influence each other 
simultaneously, so it is unclear whether a disruptive child causes their classmates 
to misbehave, or whether the classmates cause them to be disruptive. This is called 
the reflection problem (Manski 1993). Second, peer groups are not randomly 
assigned; they are selected based in part on unobserved characteristics (Angrist 
2014). Children in the same classroom often share similar backgrounds. Moreover, 
attentive parents might remove their children from classrooms with more disruptive 
peers. Because of this self-selection into groups, it is challenging to determine 
whether the outcome is a causal effect of the peers or the reason the individuals 
joined the peer group (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010; Hoxby 2000). Third, unobserved 
factors might simultaneously cause students and their peers to perform poorly.  
We solve the reflection problem by finding a predetermined proxy for peer 
ability: lead exposure. Consistent with the literature on lead exposure and academic 
outcomes, being exposed to lead is strongly associated with worse academic 
achievement, a higher likelihood of suspension, and a lower probability of 
graduating or intending to attend a four-year college in our sample (Figure 2). 
Previous research has proxied for peer ability and behavior using 
preexisting measures such as peers’ race and gender (Hoxby and Weingarth 2006; 
Hoxby 2000), feminine-sounding names of male peers (Figlio 2007), peers’ 
retention status (Lavy, Paserman, and Schlosser 2012), peers’ disability (Fletcher 
2010), or peers’ exposure to domestic violence (Carrell and Hoekstra 2010). Our 
approach is similar in that we use the presence of peers with elevated blood lead 
levels to estimate how early health shocks (i.e., lead exposure) spill over within 
school contexts to exacerbate inequality through peer effects. This is a valid 
approach as a student cannot affect their peers’ elevated blood lead levels. 
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Yet, a child’s lead exposure could be correlated with their socioeconomic 
status, which in turn has been associated with peers’ learning disruptions (Hoxby 
and Weingarth 2006; Hoxby 2000). Thus, to causally identify the spillover effect 
of a child’s lead exposure on their peers we further control for the share of cohort 
peers who are non-White or economically disadvantaged. We also control for the 
share of the student’s peers who have been tested for lead exposure. Because 
screening rates are higher among low-socioeconomic status students, additionally 
controlling for screening rates mitigates concerns about selection into testing. 
Finally, we exclude children with known EBLLs so that we can isolate the spillover 
effects of lead poisoning on peers who are not lead poisoned. 
We first examine how lead exposure affects contemporaneous outcomes, 
that is test scores, suspensions from school, and absences of peers without known 
EBLLs. To start, we compare students who attend the same school but whose grade 
cohorts randomly happen to have different proportions of children with EBLLs. 
This specification closely follows the one used by Carrell, Hoekstra, and Kuka 
(2018) and includes school-by-grade and grade-by-year fixed. The school-by-grade 
fixed effects control for unobservable characteristics of students who attend the 
same school and grade. Grade-year fixed effects account for common shocks to a 
cohort. This estimating equation is as follows: 
(1) 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽1
∑ 𝑘≠𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑡−1
+ 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑆𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜂𝑠𝑔 + 𝜙𝑔𝑡 + 𝛾𝑒 + 𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 is some outcome for child i who either has not been screened for lead 




 is the share of students in a child’s school-grade-year 
cohort (or school-classroom-grade-year cohort) with known EBLLs not including 
the student themselves. The coefficient 𝛽1 on  
∑ 𝑘≠𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑡−1
 captures the 
effect of having 100 percent of a child’s peers in a given year with known EBLLs. 
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Xit is a vector of child-specific control variables, including gender, race, birth 
month fixed effects,  economically disadvantaged (ED) status in each year, and an 
indicator for whether a child was tested for lead. The vector 𝑆𝑠𝑔𝑡 controls for 
time-varying school-grade characteristics: the percent non-White students by 
school-grade-year, the percent economically disadvantaged by school-grade-year, 
and the share of students who have been tested for lead exposure by school-grade-
year. We also control for school time-varying characteristics: annual school size, 
the share of teachers with Master’s degrees and the school-level stability rate. 𝜂𝑠𝑔 
is a school-by-grade fixed effect to account for school-by-grade-specific shocks. 
𝜙𝑔𝑡 is a grade-by-year fixed effect to account for secular cohort-level trends. 𝛾𝑒  is 
an exam type fixed effect that restricts our comparison to children who took the 
same exam. We cluster standard errors at the school level to account for arbitrary 
correlation in the error terms. 
However, this specification does not account for two potential sources of 
bias. First, school composition may change over time, and perhaps in response to 
peers’ quality. In addition, families select into schools. Thus, in our preferred 
specification, we compare siblings whose grade cohorts randomly happen to have 
different proportions of children with EBLLs. Including family fixed effects 
mitigates the selection problem by controlling for unobserved family characteristics 
that could be correlated with both peer quality and child’s outcomes, such as 
parents’ propensity to move their children to schools with fewer lead poisoned 
children. Moreover, an advantage of the North Carolina setting is that over most of 
our study period there were relatively few options for choosing public schools – 
there was no statewide voucher program (until quite recently) and relatively few 
charter schools, which accept students independently of catchment areas (and 
whose students we observe). Thus, the only way to attend a different school than 
the one assigned by catchment zone in most places was by moving or attending, 
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and fully paying for, private school. Only 5.3 percent of all North Carolina children 
attended private school over this time period (NC DPI 2020). Thus, as we will 
show, selection into schools was minimal. Including school fixed effects further 
controls for students’ characteristics that are common to the school’s catchment 
area. Remaining idiosyncratic variation in the BLLs of siblings’ cohorts offers 
plausibly exogenous variation to identify the spillover effects of lead and the effects 
of peer quality more broadly.10 Our main estimation equation is thus given by:  
(2)  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡 = 𝛽1
∑ 𝑘≠𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑡−1
+ 𝜋𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑆𝑠𝑔𝑡 + 𝜃𝑗 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜏𝑔 + 𝜎𝑡 + 𝛾𝑒 +
𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡  
which is identical to equation (1) except for the fact that we substitute the school-
by-grade fixed effects 𝜂𝑠𝑔 and grade-by-year fixed effects 𝜙𝑔𝑡 with family (𝜃𝑗), 
grade (𝜏𝑔), school (𝛿𝑠), and year (𝜎𝑡) fixed effects, and include birth order fixed 
effects in Xit.  
 There are three main threats to the internal validity of our estimates. First, 
our estimates would be biased if a child’s peers’ BLLs were correlated to the child’s 
own BLLs, or their ability, other than through classroom interactions. To address 
this issue, we measure lead exposure prior to school entrance. Moreover, family 
fixed effects account for omitted variables such as unobserved lead exposure or 
parental characteristics that could confound the effects of peer quality. School fixed 
effects help us account for selection into schools. Second, our estimates could be 
biased in the presence of common shocks that are systematically correlated with 
the proportion of peers with BLLs in a school-grade-year. Time-varying school and 
teacher controls help assuage concerns that these channels drive our results. Third, 
bias could arise if high-quality students systematically select out of schools when 
 
10 97.9 percent of sibling groups in our sample present variation in the share of lead-poisoned peers, 
suggesting that selection into treatment might not be a concern in our sample (Miller, Shenhav, and 
Grosz 2019).  
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there are more students with EBLLs. We test for school switching across siblings 
in Section VD, where we also show that our results are largely robust to including 
school-by-family fixed effects.   
 Finally, it is important that we have enough variation in our regressor of 
interest, the share of children with EBLLs in a school-grade-year, after partialling 
out our preferred set of controls and fixed effects. Appendix Figure A3 shows the 
distribution of the residuals obtained from a regression of the share of a student’s 
peers with EBLLs at the school-grade-year level on our preferred set of controls 
and fixed effects, including family, school, grade, and year fixed effects.  
V. Results 
A. The Contemporaneous Effects of Peers Exposed to Lead on Child Outcomes  
We begin by showing the effects of peers with elevated BLLs on 
contemporaneous standardized test scores, out-of-school suspensions, and 
absences. Figure 3 shows that the share of a child’s peers with EBLLs is negatively 
correlated with the child’s test scores, and positively correlated with their likelihood 
of receiving a suspension in the raw data. Table 2 confirms these patterns are causal. 
Panel A  presents the results for the effect of additional cohort peers who are lead 
poisoned on a child’s outcomes using equation (1), while Panel B uses our preferred 
specification in equation (2) with family, school, grade, and year fixed effects.11 
The two panels show a very similar pattern of results: a higher share of peers with 
EBLLs is associated with a higher likelihood of, and longer, out-of-school 
suspensions, as well as a higher likelihood of absences. Generally, within-siblings 
comparisons appear to estimate slightly smaller effects than comparisons within a 
 
11 The sample size is smaller than in Column 1 of Table 1 due to singletons and missing outcomes. 
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school-grade, suggesting that family fixed effects better control for endogenous 
selection.12 
In Panel B, we find that a ten percent increase in the proportion of cohort-
level peers with elevated BLLs in a given year leads to a 0.2 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of out-of-school suspension, compared to siblings in the 
same school. In other words, attending school with 10 percent more lead poisoned 
peers increases the suspension rate by 1.6 percent above the mean of 12.4 percent, 
and increases the suspension duration by one hour based on a 8-hour school day. 
Moreover, these increased suspensions appear to be driven at least in part by 
suspensions on the same day as suspensions for lead poisoned children and 
behavioral incidents including lead poisoned children.13 Finally, we note that the 
effect of lead poisoned peers on suspensions is similar to the effect of economically 
disadvantaged peers, while the coefficient on non-White peers is negative.  
Increased suspensions for peers of lead poisoned children could be due to 
more punitive policies at the cohort-level. For example, teachers might be more 
prone to suspending students for minor misbehavior in cohorts with more disruptive 
students. To disentangle peers’ behavior from school policies, we look at the effects 
of lead poisoned peers on absences, which should not be driven by school policies. 
We find that a 10 percent increase in the proportion of cohort-level peers with 
elevated BLLs increases the likelihood of chronic absenteeism by 0.4 percentage 
points, or 10 percent on a base of 4.2 percent, suggesting that our results are driven 
by students misbehaving more when they have more lead poisoned peers and not 
blanket-style school policies. Finally, some specifications show a decrease in test 
 
12 Appendix Table A1 estimates the same specification as in Panel A of Table 1 on the sibling 
sample to see if results differ when restricting to siblings. We find similar results using the sibling 
sample compared with the sample using all children. 
13 Placebo estimates in Appendix Figure A.2 show that we estimate effects of higher shares of 
peers with EBLLs on the likelihood of being suspended or involved in an incident with a student 
with EBLL that are 154-165% of what the mere size of the proportion of children with EBLLs in a 
given cohort implies. 
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scores among students with more lead poisoned peers, although the point estimate 
is positive and not statistically significant at conventional levels in our preferred 
specification. This suggests that the effects of having lead poisoned peers on the 
long run outcomes described in Section VB may operate through noncognitive 
skills and behavior, rather than a learning channel.14 However, it is difficult to fully 
disambiguate between these explanations. 
While we use cohort-level variation in our primary specification to avoid 
the issue of selection into classrooms by students, Panel C of Table 2 presents the 
estimates of the effect of having more lead poisoned peers in the same classroom 
using family, school, grade, and year fixed effects and all controls specified in 
equation (2). We define peer exposure at the classroom level by averaging the 
number of peers with EBLLs across all classes a child takes in that year. Thus, if 
students switch classrooms, they will have more peers overall.15 We find that 
classroom peers have a larger effect on suspensions and absences than cohort peers. 
These results could be due to both stronger connections with classroom peers and 
selection into classrooms.  
B. Long Term Effects of Peers Exposed to Lead 
We next examine whether a child’s lead poisoned peers in elementary and 
middle school affect that child’s long-run outcomes. Table 3 presents estimates of 
these long-run effects by estimating the following regressions at the student level: 
(3)  𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡  =  𝛽1
∑ 𝑘≠𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑡−1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 + 𝜋𝑋?̅? + 𝜔𝑆𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ + 𝜂𝑠𝑔 + 𝜙𝑔𝑡 +   𝑖𝑠𝑔𝑡 
 
14 Several recent papers have shown that noncognitive skills are very important to long run outcomes 
over and above test scores, such as Chetty et al. (2011) and Jackson (2018). 
15 We only have classroom-level data for a subset of the children in the sample from 2006 to 2017, 
whereas the cohort level variation is available from 1997-2017. Since we restrict test scores to 1997-
2005, we cannot estimate the effects of classroom peers on test scores. Children in grades 6 and up 
usually switch classrooms, so they are counted as many times as the number of classes they take 
with each student. 
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(4)  𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡  =  𝛽1
∑ 𝑘≠𝑖 𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑠𝐸𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑘𝑠𝑔𝑡
𝑛𝑠𝑔𝑡−1
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅
 + 𝜋𝑋?̅? + 𝜔𝑆𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ +  𝜃𝑗 + 𝛿𝑠 + 𝜏𝑔 + 𝜎𝑡 +   𝑖𝑗𝑠𝑔𝑡  
where 𝑋?̅? and 𝑆𝑠𝑡̅̅ ̅̅  include all of the individual-level controls from our primary 
specification, as well as the average share of non-White peers, the average share of 
economically disadvantaged peers, the average share of peers tested for lead, and 
the average school size, school stability rate and share of teachers with masters 
degrees over elementary and middle school. Equation (3) mirrors equation (1) by 
including school-by-grade (𝜂𝑠𝑔) and grade-by-year (𝜙𝑔𝑡) fixed effects. In equation 
(4), 𝜃𝑗, 𝛿𝑠, 𝜏𝑔 and 𝜎𝑡  are family, school, grade, and year fixed effects as in equation 
(2). Grade and year are measured during the child’s last observation. The 
coefficient 𝛽1 captures the effect of having 100 percent of peers with known EBLLs 
in elementary and middle school. 
Panels A and B of Table 3 present estimates of 𝛽1 from equations (3) and 
(4) respectively. We examine the effect of elementary and middle school peers with 
EBLLs on graduation and dropout rates, 4- and 2-year college intentions, and SAT 
taking. As with short-run outcomes, within-siblings comparisons appear to estimate 
slightly smaller effects than comparisons within a school-grade, suggesting that 
family fixed effects better control for endogenous selection. 
Our preferred specification in Panel B of Table 3 shows that a child whose 
average cohort in elementary and middle school has 10 percent more lead poisoned 
peers has a 1.7 percentage point lower likelihood of graduating high school, 
representing a 2 percent decrease on the mean graduation rate of 89 percent. We 
also find that having 10 percent more lead poisoned peers increases the likelihood 
of dropping out by 0.48 percentage points and decreases the likelihood of taking 
the SAT while in high school by 2.3 percentage points, or a 4.3 percent decrease on 
the mean rate of 53.2 percent. Finally, a higher share of lead poisoned peers 
decreases the likelihood that a student intends to attend a four-year college in Panel 
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A, although this result is not statistically significant at conventional levels in our 
preferred specification. 
 Panel C of Table 3 estimates the long-run effect of lead poisoned peers in 
elementary and middle school cohorts separately. We find that long-run outcomes 
are largely driven by middle school peers. This result is in line with our findings in 
Table 2—that exposure to disruptive peers affects behavior in middle school, which 
in turn could set students on a path to lower graduation and college attendance rates. 
Peers in middle school also could be especially impactful for long-run outcomes if 
middle school is a time when some students are deciding whether to remain in 
school. Finally, student learning and behavior in middle school might be especially 
important for college readiness (Naven 2019). 
While we find mixed evidence of peer effects on test scores, we estimate 
effects on college going that are similar in magnitude to those obtained by Carrell, 
Hoekstra, and Kuka (2018). Those authors find that one male peer exposed to 
domestic violence increases the number of suspensions by 0.01 (although this result 
is not statistically significant) and decreases four-year college going by 1.4 
percentage points. Using our cohort results and assuming that there are 25 students 
in a class, we calculate that adding an additional lead poisoned peer to each class, 
a 0.04% increase in the share of lead poisoned peers, would lead to a 0.08 
percentage points increase in the probability of being suspended, a 12-minutes 
increase in the suspension duration, a 0.92 percentage point reduction in the 
likelihood of taking the SATs, a proxy for college intentions, and a 0.67 percentage 
point reduction in graduating high school.   
C. Mechanisms and Heterogeneity of Estimated Effects 
We hypothesize that children friends’ groups might drive peer effects. As 
we lack data on friendship networks, we exploit the fact that children likely sort 
into groups with similar characteristics (Jackson 2010). Table 4 presents both the 
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effect of exposure to a higher share of lead poisoned peers and the additional effect 
of exposure to a higher share of lead poisoned peers of the same gender (Panel A), 
race (Panel B), and same gender and same race (Panel C). We find that same gender 
peers with EBLLs have larger effects on both short-run outcomes (suspensions) and 
long-run outcomes (high school graduation and SAT taking), while same-race peers 
have larger effects on suspensions only. The limited effects of same-race peers on 
long-run outcomes suggest the effects of homophily in networks might diminish 
over time, potentially due to selection.  
Because exposure to lead poisoned peers could interact with a child’s 
background to shape their outcomes, we next study heterogeneity in peer effects by 
demographic subgroups. For example, students of different socioeconomic status 
might have differential access to resources, such as academic help outside of 
school, that could ameliorate the effects of peers with EBLLs. Table 5 presents our 
preferred estimates by race/ethnicity (White, non-Hispanic in Panel A, Black 
students in Panel B, and Hispanic students in Panel C), by economically 
disadvantaged status (never economically disadvantaged in Panel D, sometimes 
economically disadvantaged in Panel E, and always economically disadvantaged in 
Panel F), and by gender (girls in Panel G and boys in panel H). 
We find some evidence of heterogeneous effects of lead poisoned peers on 
graduation by race and gender. Black students see the largest decrease in high 
school graduation from lead poisoned peers. Boys also seem more affected than 
girls by lead poisoned peers, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
Black and male students have lower graduation rates to start with, so our results 
suggest that these students’ learning and behavior might be disproportionally 
affected when there are disruptive peers. Panel A of Appendix Table A2 shows that 
lead poisoned boys have larger negative effects on their peers than lead poisoned 
girls for suspensions from school and SAT taking. Together, these results support 
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the hypothesis that peer effects are mediated by assortative matching of peer 
groups, as shown in Table 4. 
We find little systematic evidence of heterogeneity by socioeconomic 
status. Students who are economically disadvantaged only in some grades appear 
to have larger increases in suspensions and decreases in graduation rates than 
students who are either never or always economically disadvantaged, but this 
difference is not statistically significant. Appendix Table A3 presents estimates of 
the effects of lead poisoned peers for children in schools with different levels of 
poverty. We find stronger negative peer effects on suspensions in schools with the 
highest share of economically disadvantaged students, but mixed evidence of 
heterogeneity in long-run outcomes. This finding suggests that poverty might 
exacerbate the effects of having lead poisoned peers. 
D. Additional Threats to Internal Validity 
This section discusses and tests for threats to internal validity, including 
spurious correlation, selection into lead testing, measurement error, and 
endogenous sorting. 
If our results are driven by increases in peers’ blood lead levels, we would 
expect students exposed to a higher percentage of cohort peers with elevated BLLs 
to do worse. Figure 4 plots estimates from equations (2) and (4) using bins for 
different percentages of cohort peers with elevated BLLs (0-5%, 5%-10%, 10%-
15%, 15%-20%, 20%-100%).16 We find a stronger effect of lead poisoned peers on 
suspensions and graduation rates as the percentage of peers with elevated BLLs 
increases. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that our estimates are unlikely to be due to 
random chance. This figure plots the results from estimating 500 placebo 
specifications in which we assign a random share of lead poisoned peers to each 
 
16 We omit the indicator for having 0-5% of cohort peers with elevated BLLs from the regression. 
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school-grade-year cohort drawn from a distribution with the same mean and 
standard deviation as the empirically observed peers’ distribution. Our true 
estimates for the effects of lead poisoned peers on suspensions and graduation rates 
fall well outside the distribution of estimates from the placebo specifications. 
However, we do not observe lead exposure for all children and there may 
be selection in who is tested for lead, implying that we measure the share of lead 
poisoned children in each cohort with error. Since we compute the share of lead 
poisoned peers over all students in a cohort, irrespective of whether they have a 
blood lead test, unknown lead poisoned peers would attenuate our results. North 
Carolina requires screening for all children living in zip codes where at least one 
block group within the zip code has 27 percent or more homes built prior to 1950.17 
Column 1 of Table 6 shows the effects of lead poisoned peers on children in these 
high-risk zip codes, where screening rates are 16 percent higher than average. We 
find only a slightly larger effect on graduation than in the full sample suggesting 
attenuation bias due to measurement error is a minor concern. 
Furthermore, we identify siblings based on home addresses, which could 
lead to error, particularly in multi-family homes. Thus, Column 2 of Table 6 shows 
results on the sample of Census tracts where the majority of homes are single family 
homes. Again, we find only a slightly larger effect on graduation than in the full 
sample. 
In addition, if parents of high-achieving students pull their children out of a 
cohort with particularly disadvantaged or lead poisoned students, such nonrandom 
selection could lead us to misattribute poor peers’ performance to the larger 
presence of lead poisoned students. Importantly, most of North Carolina did not 
offer school choice options for public schools over our sample period: with one 
exception, up until the 2014-2015 school year, students could only switch schools 
 
17 The designation also adjusts for prevalence of elevated BLLs (Hanchette 1999). 
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if they switched into a charter or magnet school, which we observe in our data.18 
Column 3 of Table 6 shows that our results are larger for children in zip codes with 
no charter schools or other school choice options (at the time), which are effectively 
no-choice zip codes, suggesting our results in Table 3 are a lower bound on the true 
spillovers of lead poisoning.  
Table 7 formally investigates the association between a student’s share of 
lead poisoned peers and school switching. We find limited evidence of increased 
switching to public or charter schools of students with higher shares of lead 
poisoned peers or of their siblings, and if anything the coefficients are negative. 
Thus, differential sorting does not appear to drive our results. To further test 
whether differential school switching biases our results, Column 4 of Table 6 
controls for siblings-by-school fixed effects, effectively comparing siblings only in 
grades during which they attend the same school.19 We find spillover effects of lead 
poisoned peers that are two-thirds the size of our main result. 
Our estimates could also be biased if the share of peers with EBLLs in a 
school-grade-year is systematically correlated with students’ or peers’ 
characteristics other than those included in equation (4). Column 5 of Table 6 
controls for the share of a student’s peers who live in block groups with above-
median income, share Black and Hispanic residents, share in poverty, and share 
with a high school degree. The estimate of the effects of lead poisoned peers is 
virtually indistinguishable from our main estimate in Table 3, suggesting that we 
are capturing the true effect of lead exposure, and not other correlates. Column 6 of 
Table 6 adds fixed effects for the Census block group where students reside when 
 
18 In the 2014-2015 school year, North Carolina implemented the Opportunity Scholarships 
program, a voucher program for low income children. Children whose families make less than 133 
percent of the qualifying amount for the federal free or reduced-price lunch program qualify for the 
voucher, which can be used for any school. In addition, the Charlotte Mecklenburg Public School 
district has had a school choice program from 2002 so we exclude that district.  
19 Bertoni, Brunello, and Cappellari (2020) use this design to study the effects of privileged peers. 
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they first appear in the school data. The results are similar to those in our main 
specification despite the sample size being smaller due to missing block group 
information, suggesting that neighborhood characteristics, including 
contemporaneous pollution exposure not captured by BLLs by age 6, do not drive 
the results. Column 7 of Table 6 further shows that estimates using more stringent 
school-grade fixed effects are similar to our main results that include school and 
grade fixed effects. 
Finally, because the incidence of lead poisoning has decreased over time 
(Figure 1), our primary estimates might capture similarly occurring trends in 
outcomes despite controlling for grade and year fixed effects. To assuage this 
concern, in Column 8 of Table 6, we control for school-year fixed effects and find 
peer effects that are larger than our main results, suggesting that differential trends 
in neighborhood-level removal of lead hazards might lead us to underestimate the 
spillover effects of lead poisoning, if anything. 
To address the concern that blood lead levels are measured with some error, 
in Panels B and C of Appendix Table A2, we show that our results are largely robust 
to using different measures of lead-exposed peers, although when we define EBLLs 
as BLLs≥10 µg/dL we find larger effects on long-run outcomes, suggesting that the 
severity of lead poisoning might affect the magnitude of these peer effects.20 In 
Panel D we include all students, even those who are exposed to lead, and control 
for one’s own lead exposure. The estimates are largely similar to our main results.  
Finally, Appendix Table A4 shows the robustness of our specification to 
different sets of controls. Panel A shows that when omitting all controls other than 
family, school, grade, and year fixed effects, we would find larger 
 
20 We estimate a small and insignificant effect of peers with BLLs≥10 µg/dL on suspensions. One 
potential explanation is that interventions targeted at children with BLLs above this intervention 
threshold successfully improve these children’s short-run outcomes, but do not completely mitigate 
damages in the long-run. 
27 
contemporaneous but smaller long-run peer effects, suggesting that spurious 
correlations might arise even with our conservative specification. Reassuringly, 
Panel B shows that once we add individual and school-level time-varying controls, 
omitting the share of students in a school-grade-year who are non-White and the 
share of students who are economically disadvantaged does not affect our estimates 
compared to our main results. In other words, peers’ characteristics other than lead 
poisoning do not appear to explain much of the variation in students’ outcomes 
after controlling for the set of fixed effects that provides our identification.21 This 
finding suggests that the share of lead poisoned peers does not just capture the effect 
of non-White or poor peers. Panel C shows that excluding school fixed effects 
yields slightly larger peer effects on suspensions compared to our main results. 
These results suggest that our more conservative primary specification controls for 
unobserved time invariant school characteristics. 
VI. Conclusion 
This is the first study documenting the spillover effects of lead onto school 
peers. By comparing siblings who attend the same school, we find that a child’s 
own lead exposure spills over to affect other children’s behavior and long-run 
outcomes. A ten percent increase in middle school peers with elevated BLLs in a 
given year leads to a 1.6 percent increase above the mean in the likelihood of being 
suspended out of school and a ten percent increase in chronic absenteeism. A ten 
percent increase in peers with elevated BLLs over a student’s elementary and 
middle school career causes a 2 percent decrease in the likelihood of graduating 
high school, and a 4.3 percent decrease in the likelihood of taking the SAT. These 
large effects suggest that the social cost of lead exposure has been underestimated 
 
21 Related, Appendix Table A5 shows limited evidence that peers’ composition at the cohort level 
is related to school quality in a way that could confound our estimates. Cohorts with higher share of 
students with EBLLs appear to be in school-years with higher stability rate, if anything, and larger 
student bodies.  
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so far. Our results suggest that environmental hazards are an important factor 
contributing to human capital accumulation even for children who are not 
themselves exposed to these hazards. In addition, we show that peers can have long 
term consequences on human capital formation and reveal some mechanisms 
through which peer effects manifest, namely homophily in network formation and 
behavior shaping while in middle school likely through noncognitive skills. 
Furthermore, our findings have implications for other types of common pollution 
that are known to cause suspensions from school, such as traffic and industrial 
pollution (Persico and Venator 2020; Heissel, Persico, and Simon 2020), 
suggesting that the true cost of pollution has been underestimated.   
We likely estimate a lower bound of the effect of lead poisoned peers. We 
find strong evidence of worse outcomes for children exposed to more lead poisoned 
peers despite their siblings are likely exposed to disruptive peers as well and despite 
potential spillovers within siblings, too. Moreover, missing BLLs for some lead 
poisoned children would attenuate our findings.  
While external validity issues make it difficult to extrapolate how lead 
exposure might affect labor market outcomes, we attempt a back of the envelope 
calculation for the effect of one lead poisoned peer in a cohort of 220. We find that 
being exposed to one additional lead poisoned peer is associated with $71 in lost 
earnings per student from lower graduation rates alone.22 This estimate does not 
include the additional costs of behavioral issues, yet, it implies a spillover effect of 
 
22 Following Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2006), we estimate the net present value of graduating 
high school to be $93,188. We estimate a schooling-experience-earnings profile non-parametrically 
in the 2018 March Current Population Survey data and predict earnings conditional on years of 
schooling at each age between 18 and 65, assuming a growth rate of real labor productivity growth 
of 1.9 percent and a discount rate of 3.38 (i.e., the 30-year Treasury bond rate).  As 1 in 220 students 
is a 0.46% increase in the share of peers with elevated BLLs, we multiply that by our estimate of 
the effect of 100% of peers with elevated BLLs on graduation (-16.63 percentage points) to obtain 
the impact of one child with EBLLs through elementary and middle school on graduation rates: -
0.076 percentage points, or a decrease in the probability of 0.00076. Thus, one child with EBLLs in 
a cohort would decrease the net present value of lifetime earnings by 0.00076*$93,188=$71.  
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a lead poisoned child of $15,549 on their 219 school peers. As half a million young 
children appear to still be poisoned by lead each year (Aizer et al. 2018) and lead 
poisoned students appear to be quite dispersed across schools, these spillovers total 
almost $8 billion per birth-year cohort. Reyes (2014) estimates the direct social cost 
of lead poisoning at $200 billion per birth-year cohort. Thus, our, likely lower-
bound, estimates suggest that the social cost of lead has been underestimated by at 
least 4 percent by not including these spillover effects. Importantly, our analysis 
suggests that most public school children in the United States are likely affected by 
the spillover effects of lead.  
Our results imply some important lessons for policy. Remediating lead 
hazards is likely to be more cost effective than previously supposed since lead 
exposure affects everyone in the classroom. Lead remediation efforts have shown 
positive impacts on children’s blood lead levels and test scores (Sorensen et al. 
2019). In addition, Billings and Schnepel (2018) show that offering early 
interventions for lead poisoned children improves their outcomes. Thus, early 
interventions might help both lead poisoned children and their peers.  
Finally, school segregation by race and socioeconomic status likely 
exacerbates these peer effects, suggesting that additional efforts to desegregate 
students might be beneficial. Low-income schools have some of the largest 
achievement gaps (e.g., see Reardon 2015). Our results suggest that peer effects 
and lead exposure contribute to low performance in high-poverty schools, as well 
as to the negative long-run outcomes associated with poverty. Lead exposure and 
exposure to lead poisoned peers are both mechanisms through which poverty 
produces worse human capital outcomes. Understanding how the organization of 
schools mitigates these negative effects is crucial to design policies that curb the 
negative consequences of lead poisoning and pollution exposure. 
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school in North 
Carolina 
(2) 














share of EBLL 






share of EBLL 
peers in all 
elementary 
grades 
Average test score 0.001 0.063 -0.117 -0.288 0.128 -0.094 0.265 
Any out-of-school  
suspension 
0.265 0.258 0.305 0.404 0.238 0.314 0.202 
Ever graduated 0.837 0.872 0.866 0.816 0.881 0.848 0.895 
4-year college 
intentions 
0.418 0.454 0.398 0.346 0.471 0.387 0.516 
Has taken the SAT 0.434 0.466 0.411 0.366 0.482 0.405 0.522 
Cohort size 220 225 199 203 229 193 261 
Share of teachers 
with an MA 
degree 




0.438 0.441 0.512 0.521 0.429 0.528 0.343 
Stability rate 0.929 0.957 0.957 0.953 0.958 0.955 0.960 
Share Black 0.272 0.249 0.308 0.432 0.226 0.308 0.188 
Share Hispanic 0.122 0.124 0.144 0.107 0.126 0.136 0.112 
Share with a BLL 
test 
0.338 0.396 1 1 0.322 0.534 0.255 
Share with EBLL 0.071 0.079 0.200 0.725 0 0.118 0.040 
N Students 3,334,365 1,326,622 525,535 144,957 1,181,665 670,386 656,236 
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for selected variables in our sample. Observations are at the student-year level. Cohort is defined as student-grade-year. Column 1 shows 
the means for all children in our original sample. Column 2 shows means for children with siblings, that is our main sample. Column 3 shows means for children that have a blood 
lead level test. Column 4 shows means for children with elevated blood lead levels (EBLLs), and Column 5 shows means for children without elevated blood lead levels. Column 6 
shows means for children whose share of elementary school peers with elevated BLLs was above the median share at the grade-year level in at least one grade, while Column 7 
shows means for children whose share was below the median in all elementary grades. Test scores are standardized at the grade-year level. The stability rate is defined as the 
percentage of students from the October membership count who are still present in the second semester (90 days later). 
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Table 2: Contemporaneous Effects of Attending School with an Increased Share of 






























Panel A: Cohort Peers with School-Grade and Grade-Year Fixed Effects 
Share of peers with 













Observations 3,303,025 7,924,730 7,924,730 7,196,034 6,542,610 8,135,286 
N Students  932,753 1,907,865 1,907,865 1,884,925 1,765,517 1,903,431 
Mean of outcome 0.0572 0.1049 0.7744 0.0318 0.0202 0.0612 
Panel B: Cohort Peers with Family, School, Grade and Year Fixed Effects 
Share of peers with 














































Observations 1,414,124 4,290,255 4,290,255 3,921,543 3,673,505 4,397,906 
N Students 374,137 944,681 944,681 933,835 891,487 939,623 
Mean of outcome 0.1169 0.1238 0.5041 0.0285 0.0187 0.0424 
Panel C: Peers in the Same Classroom with Family and School Fixed Effects 
Share of peers with 











Observations -------- 3,700,650 3,700,650 3,416,626 3,416,626  3,679,226 
N Students -------- 877,934 877,934 824,400  824,400  884,139 
Mean of outcome -------- 0.0931 0.6325 0.0138  0.0082 0.0507 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with EBLLs on the child’s school outcomes. Panels A 
and B use the share of peers with maximum BLLs over 5 µg/dL at the school-grade-year level as the main explanatory 
variable, while panel C use the share of peers with maximum BLLs over 5 µg/dL at the classroom level. Panel A 
includes school-by-grade, grade-by-year and birth month fixed effects. Panels B and C instead include family, school, 
grade, and year fixed effects, controlling for birth order. In Column 1, we take the average of math and reading test 
scores and additionally control for subject-by-type test fixed effects. In Columns 2-6 we limit the sample to grades 6 
and above. All regressions control for individual and cohort controls, which include indicators for gender, race, 
economically disadvantaged status, whether the student has a blood lead level test, the share of non-White peers, share 
of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. 
We also control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. Standard errors are 
in parentheses and clustered at the school level.  +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 3: Long-Run Outcomes of Exposure to Peers with Elevated BLLs by Timing of 
Exposure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 












 Panel A: Share of All Peers with EBLLs Over Elementary and Middle School 
with School-Grade and Grade-Year Fixed Effects  
Share of peers with 











Mean of outcome 0.8491 0.0597 0.4406 0.3544 0.4588 
N Students 831,386 1,157,178 666,821 666,159 657,878 
 Panel B: Share of All Peers with EBLLs Over Elementary and Middle School 
with Sibling, School, Grade and Year Fixed Effects 
Share of peers with 











Mean of outcome 0.8904 0.0529 0.5068 0.3288 0.5319 
N Students 283,032 415,049 205,833 205,761 201,784 
 Panel C: Share of Elementary Versus Middle School Peers with EBLLs with 
Sibling, School, Grade and Year Fixed Effects  
Share of peers with 













Share of peers with 
BLLs over 5 µg/dL 











Mean of outcome 0.8944 0.0519 0.5108 0.3299 0.5380 
N Students 248,478 355,238 182,351 182,294 178,875 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s long-run 
outcomes. We restrict the sample to the highest grade a student is observed in. Column 1 reports the effects on the 
likelihood a student ever graduates from high school, and column 2 shows the effects on the likelihood of ever 
dropping out of school. Columns 3 and 4 show the effects on self-reported intention of enrolling in a four-year college 
and community college, respectively. Column 5 shows the effects on the likelihood of taking the SAT test by grade 
12. Panel A includes school-by-grade and grade-by-year fixed effects. Panels B and C instead include family, school, 
grade, and year fixed effects, controlling for birth order and birth month. All regressions include individual controls 
for gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the student has a blood lead level test. We also 
control for the average share of elementary and middle school peers that are non-White or economically 
disadvantaged, average share of children with a lead test, school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers 
with an MA degree averaged over elementary and middle school. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at 
the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 4: Heterogeneity by Peer Gender and Race 















Panel A: By Same-Gender Lead Poisoned Peers 








     






Panel B: By Same-Race Lead Poisoned Peers (White) 








     






Panel C: By Same Gender-Race Lead Poisoned Peers (White) 
Share of same gender-race peers with 







     






     
N Students 944,678  283,032 201,784 
Mean of outcome 0.1037  0.8904 0.5319 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school 
outcomes. Panel A reports the effect of a child’s share of same-gendered peers with elevated blood lead levels on the 
child’s school outcomes, Panel B reports the reports the effect of a child’s share of same-race peers with elevated 
blood lead levels, and Panel C reports the effect of a child’s same-race and same-gender share of peers with elevated 
blood lead levels. All regressions include the cohort, school-level and individual controls listed in equation (2), as 
well as family, birth month, birth order, school, grade, and year fixed effects. Cohort and school controls are averaged 
over elementary and middle school in Columns 2-3. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school 
level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 5:  Heterogeneity by Demographic Subgroups 









Took the SAT 
Panel A: White, non-Hispanic students 










Panel B: Black non-Hispanic students 










p-val. =White 0.60  0.05 0.19 
Panel C: Hispanic students 










p-val. =White 0.71  0.95 0.24 
Panel D: Never Economically Disadvantaged students 










Panel E: Sometimes Economically Disadvantaged students 










p-val. =Never 0.27  0.25 0.14 
Panel F: Always Economically Disadvantaged students 










p-val. =Never 0.68  0.30 0.59 
Panel G: Girls 










Panel H: Boys 










p-val. =Girls 0.46  0.13 0.88 
 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school 
outcomes for children with different observable characteristics in each panel. For each outcome, results are from three 
regressions, one for each characteristic (race, economic status, gender). All regressions include cohort and individual 
controls, as well as family, birth month, birth order, school, grade, and year fixed effects. Individual controls include 
indicators for whether the student has a blood lead level test, gender, race, and economically disadvantaged status. 
Cohort controls include the share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who 
are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. We also control for school size, the stability rate, and 
the percent of teachers with an MA degree. Cohort and school controls are averaged over elementary and middle 
school in Columns 2-3. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.
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Table 6: Results for Alternative Samples and Alternative Specifications 











































Share of peers with 

















N Students 146,599 84,729 175,973 228,036 283,032 118,747 282,582 281,851 
Mean of outcome 0.8800 0.8830 0.8934 0.8904 0.8904 0.8904 0.8904 0.8925 
School FEs X X X  X X   
Sibling FEs X X X  X X X X 
Year FEs X X X X X X X  
Grade FEs X X X X X X  X 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school outcomes. Each column reports results from a 
separate regression. Column 1 restricts the sample to students who live in zip codes that are subject to universal lead screening. Column 2 restricts the sample to 
Census tracts where more than half of homes are single family homes. Column 3 restricts the sample to zip codes without charter schools or voucher programs. 
Columns 4-8 add controls and alternative sets of fixed effects as specified at the top and bottom of each column. Block group characteristics of cohort peers include 
share of peers that live in block groups with above median income, above median percent Black and Hispanic population, above median percent of the population 
living in poverty, and with above median percent population with a high school degree. All regressions include cohort and individual controls, as well as birth 
month and birth order fixed effects. Individual controls include indicators for gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the student has a blood 
lead level test. Cohort controls include the share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged 
at the school-grade-year level. We also control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. Cohort and school controls are 


















Sibling is in a Different 
School for the Same 
Grade 
Share of peers with BLLs 











Observations 6,555,045 6,452,608 1,576,604 840,101 4,193,920 
N Students 1,094,875 1,089,551 491,901 309,887 587,149 
Mean of outcome 0.3063 0.0050 0.3464 0.1310 0.1858 
Notes: The table reports the association of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels with the child’s own likelihood of switching schools (Columns 
1 and 2), the child’s sibling’s likelihood of switching schools conditional on attending the same school (Column 3), both children switching schools conditional on 
attending the same school (Column 4), and the likelihood that a consecutive younger sibling attends a different school than the child’s school for the same grade 
(Column 5). All regressions include cohort and individual controls, as well as family, birth month, birth order, school, grade, and year fixed effects. Individual 
controls include indicators for gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the student has a blood lead level test. Cohort controls include the 
share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. We also 
control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 










Figure 1: Share of Children with Blood Lead Levels at or above 5µg/dL by Birth Cohort 
and Share of Children with Blood Lead Tests by Cohort 
 
Notes: The figure plots the share of children in a school-grade-year cohort with at least one blood lead test (blue 










Figure 2: The Relationship Between a Child’s Own Blood Lead Levels and Test Scores, Out-of-School Suspensions, High 
School Graduation, and SAT Taking 
Panel A: Test scores    Panel B: Likelihood of Out of School Suspension 
                          
Panel C: Ever Graduated 
 
Panel D: SAT Taking 
 
Notes: The figure plots average test scores (Panel A), out-of-school suspension rates (Panel B), graduation rates (Panel C), and SAT taking rates 
(Panel D) by students’ blood lead levels and adds the line of best fit.  
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Figure 3: The Relationship Between Peers’ Blood Lead Levels and Test Scores, Out-of-School Suspensions, High School 
Graduation, and SAT Taking 
 
Panel A: Test scores 
 
Panel B: Likelihood of Out-of-School Suspensions 
 
 
Panel C: Ever Graduated 
 
Panel D: SAT Taking 
 
Notes: The figure plots average test scores (Panel A), out-of-school suspension rates (Panel B), graduation rates (Panel C), and SAT taking rates 
(Panel D) by vigintile of students’ share of peers with blood lead levels at or above 5µg/dL.  
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Figure 4: Binned Effects of Share of Peers with Blood Lead Levels above 5 µg/dL 
Panel A: Likelihood of Out-of-School Suspension 
 
Panel B: Ever Graduated 
 
 
Notes: Each figure plots non-parametric estimates of the effect of having different proportions (binned) of peers with BLLs 5+ in a child’s cohort on out-of-school 
suspension rates (Panel A) and graduation rates (Panel B). The omitted category is an indicator for share of peers with BLLs 5+ that is lower than 0.05. We control 
for all fixed effects and controls in our primary specification (which includes family, school, year, and grade fixed effects, and individual and demographic controls 
by cohort, averaged over elementary and middle school in Panel B). Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors clustered at the 
school level.
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Figure 5: Placebo Estimates 
 
Notes: Distribution of results from 500 placebo tests per outcome. Our main estimates for our preferred specification 
are represented with a vertical line on the placebo effect size distribution. The lightly shaded gray region is the 
region of the graph where there is 5% in the tail of the distribution. The darker shaded gray region represents 10% in 
the tail of the distribution. For each placebo, school-grade cohorts were randomly assigned a percent of peers with 
EBLLs from the empirically observed distribution and we estimated our main specification.   
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APPENDIX: FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION 
A. Additional Tables and Figures 
Table A1: Results with School-grade and grade-year fixed effects on sibling sample  









Took the SAT  
Share of peers 








Observations 4,290,161 282,782 201,719 
N Students 944,679 282,782 201,719 
Mean of outcome 0.0942 0.8911 0.5320 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school 
outcomes. The sample is limited to children with siblings who would be included in a regression with sibling fixed 
effects. Each column reports results from a separate regression. All regressions include school-by-grade, grade-by-
year, and birth month fixed effects. All regressions include the cohort, school-level and individual controls listed in 
equation (1). Cohort and school controls are averaged over elementary and middle school in Columns 2-3.  Standard 
errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table A2: Alternative measures of peers’ BLLs and sample including lead poisoned 
students 
 Short Run Outcomes  Long-run Outcomes 
 (1) 
Out of School 
Suspension 
 (2)  
Ever Graduated 
(3) 
Took the SAT 
Panel A: Share of Male and Female Peers with Max BLL over 5 µg/dL 
Share of male 
peers with BLLs 







Share of female 
peers with BLLs 







Panel B: Mean BLL is over 5 µg/dL 
Share of peers 








Panel C: Max BLL is over 10 µg/dL 
Share of peers 










N Students 944,681  281,098 200,186 
Mean of outcome 0.1037  0.8902 0.5316 
Panel D: Including Students with Elevated Blood Lead Levels 
Share of peers 








N Students 1,081,179  361,787 257,202 
Mean of outcome 0.1125  0.8768 0.5031 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school outcomes 
using different measures of peer exposure based on blood lead levels. Panel A uses the share of male and share of female 
peers with maximum BLL over 5 µg/dL. Panel B uses the share of peers with average BLL above 5 µg/dL. Panel C uses 
the share of peers with maximum BLL over 10 µg/dL. Panel D includes children who have maximum BLL over 5 µg/dL. 
All regressions include cohort and individual controls, as well as family, birth month, birth order, school, grade, and year 
fixed effects. Individual controls include indicators for gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the 
student has a blood lead level test. Cohort controls include the share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, 
and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level, school size, the stability rate, 
and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. Cohort and school controls are averaged over elementary and middle school 




Table A3:  Heterogeneity by School-Level Demographics 










Took the SAT  
Panel A: Schools in Lowest Tercile of Share Students who are Economically Disadvantaged 
Share of peers with 








Panel B: Schools in Middle Tercile of Share Students who are Economically Disadvantaged 
Share of peers with 








p-val = First Tercile 0.33 
 
0.85 0.89 
Panel C: Schools in Highest Tercile of Share Students who are Economically Disadvantaged 
Share of peers with 







p-val = First Tercile 0.06 
 
0.83 0.61 
N Students 931,381 222,894 162,137 
Mean of outcome 0.1034 0.8964 0.5454 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school 
outcomes for children in schools with different shares of children who are economically disadvantaged in each panel. 
For each outcome, results are from a single regression. All regressions include cohort and individual controls, as well 
as family, birth month, birth order, school, grade, and year fixed effects. Individual controls include indicators for 
gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the student has a blood lead level test. Cohort controls 
include the share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically 
disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. We also control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of 
teachers with an MA degree. Cohort and school controls are averaged over elementary and middle school in Columns 
2-3. Standard errors are clustered at the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table A4: Results with Fewer Controls  









Took the SAT  
Panel A: No controls 
Share of peers 








Observations 4,290,255 283,032 201,784 
N Students 944,681 283,032 201,784 
Panel B: All Controls Except for Share Non-White and Share Educationally Disadvantaged 
Share of peers 








Observations 4,290,255 248,478 178,875 
N Students 944,681 248,478 178,875 
Panel C: Family Fixed Effects 
Share of peers 








Observations 4,290,270 283,236 201,814 
N Students 944,682 283,236 201,814 
Notes: The table reports the effect of a child’s share of peers with elevated blood lead levels on the child’s school 
outcomes. Each cell reports results from a separate regression. All regressions include sibling, birth month, grade, 
year and birth order fixed effects. Panel A shows our results with no control variables except for our fixed effects and 
school fixed effects. Panel B includes school fixed effects and controls for gender, race, economically disadvantaged 
status, whether the student has a blood lead level test, the share of children with a lead test at the school-grade-year 
level, as well as school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. We omit cohort-level 
controls for share of non-White peers and share of peers who are economically disadvantaged. Panel C includes our 
fixed effects together with all controls in our main specification but omits school fixed effects. Cohort and school 
controls are averaged over elementary and middle school in Columns 2-3. Standard errors are in parentheses and 
clustered at the school level. +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
  
51 
Table A5: Correlation of Cohort Composition and Measures of School Quality 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 

















Share of peers with 











      
Observations 7,611,499 7,760,468 7,760,559 7,760,559 7,760,559 
Mean ofoutcome 0.3657 0.9575 0.0191 0.0000 782.1071 
N Students 1,171,476 1,177,800 1,177,800 1,177,800 1,177,800 
Notes: The table reports the correlation of a child’s share of peers with EBLLs in a cohort with school-year 
characteristics. Regressions include family, school, grade, and year fixed effects, controlling for birth order. All 
regressions control for individual and cohort controls, which include indicators for gender, race, economically 
disadvantaged status, whether the student has a blood lead level test, the share of non-White peers, share of children 
with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. We also 
control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree when those are not the 
dependent variable. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the school level.  +  p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** 




Figure A1: Share of Lead-Exposed Peers by Birth Order 
 
Notes: This figure plots the average share of cohort peers with blood lead levels at or above 5µg/dL by a student’s birth order. Birth order is set to 0 for only 
children and children for which we are not able to match siblings.   
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Figure A2: Identifying Variation: Residual Variation in Share of Peers with Elevated Blood Lead Levels 
 
    
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of the residuals from a regression of our variable of interest, share of peers with blood lead levels at or above 5µg/dL on 
the fixed effects and controls included in our preferred specification. We include family, birth month, birth order, grade, school, and year fixed effects. Individual 
controls include indicators for gender, race, economically disadvantaged status, and whether the student has a blood lead level test. Cohort controls include the 
share of non-White peers, share of children with a lead test, and the share of peers who are economically disadvantaged at the school-grade-year level. We also 
control for school size, the stability rate, and the percent of teachers with an MA degree. The black solid line plots the kernel density of these residuals, while the 




Figure A3: Placebo Estimates: Out-of-School Suspensions and Incidents with Students with EBLLs 
 
Panel A: OSS Same Day as Student with EBLL  Panel B: Incident with Student with EBLL 
  
Notes: Distribution of results from 500 placebo tests per outcome. Our main estimates for our preferred specification are represented with a vertical line on the 
placebo effect size distribution. The lightly shaded gray region is the region of the graph where there is 5% in the tail of the distribution. The darker shaded gray 
region represents 10% in the tail of the distribution. For each placebo, we randomly selected a share of student equal to the observed share of students in EBLLs 
in that school-grade cohort and construct indicators for their peers being suspended out-of-school on the same day as one of these random students and having an 
incident together with one of these random students. We then estimated our main specification with these placebo outcomes.   
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B: Data Appendix 
B1. Data linkage 
 
NCERDC performed the linkage between the education and BLL data according to the 
following algorithm and anonymized the dataset for us. Appendix Table B1 reports the number 
of tests matched at each step. 
1. Exact match on school district, that is local education agency (LEA), or county and first 
and last name, date of birth. 
2. Exact match on first and last name, date of birth 
3. Exact match on LEA or county and first and last name, but allow for mistakes in one of 
day, month, or year of birth 
4. Exact match on LEA or county, last name, and date of birth, allow for close first name or 
nickname 
5. Exact match on LEA or county, first name, and date of birth, allow for close last name 
6. Exact match on last name, date of birth, allow for close first name or nickname 
7. Exact match on first name, date of birth, allow for close last name 
8. Exact match on first and last name, but allow for mistakes in one of day, month, or year 
of birth 
9. Exact match on first and last name 
 




Number of Tests 
(3) 
Share 
1 1,352,623 0.606457 
2 431,987 0.193684 
3 24,098 0.010804 
4 104,751 0.046966 
5 190,154 0.085257 
6 32,860 0.014733 
7 44,963 0.020159 
8 5,168 0.002317 
9 43,765 0.019622 
Notes: This table reports the additional number of tests matched at each step. Column 1 reports the match step, 
Column 2 reports the number of standardized tests, and Column 3 reports the share of children with each of these. 
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B2. Sibling Identification Algorithm 
In this data appendix, we describe the algorithm used to identify siblings using students’ 
geocoded home addresses. 
There are 4.38 million unique students in the NCERDC data. Of these, about 740,000 do 
not have a home address and another 640,000 do not have birthday information. Since both home 
addresses and birthdays are crucial for identifying siblings, we drop these observations when 
running the linkage algorithm. We also ignore about 660,000 students who never share a home 
address with another student and therefore do not have siblings in our data.  
We further restrict our sample to include home addresses with at most four students in 
any given year. We do this for several reasons. First, the geocoded address variable provided by 
NCERDC is based on street address and does not distinguish between different units that share 
the same street address. This means that students living in different apartment units within the 
same building appear to be living at the same home address. Because of this, we observe 
addresses with hundreds of students in a given year, and it is implausible that these students are 
siblings. Second, we observe that students who share a geocoded address with many other 
students often move across addresses. We suspect some of these students are in the foster care 
system and therefore it is difficult to identify their siblings with certainty. Three, according to the 
2000 Census, the average number of children per family in North Carolina is 1.75, and thus we 
are conservative in limiting the number of children living together in any given year to at most 
four. Four, the algorithm speed is decreasing in the number of students living together in any 
given year. Thus, we apply our algorithm to addresses with no more than four students in a given 
year. This selection eliminates about 211,000 students, 80,000 of which always share an address 
with at least four other children.   
We are left with about 2.12 million students on which we run the sibling identifying 
algorithm. The following steps summarize the process:  
1. Identify all students who live together at any point or could be living together by 
transitivity and assign a tentative family identifier to these students. For example, Ana 
and Bob are observed living together in some years, Bob and Claire are observed living 
together in other years, but Ana and Claire are never observed living together. We 
temporarily assign Ana, Bob, and Claire to the same family.  
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2. For each potential sibling pair within the temporary families, check if the students are 
ever observed living at different addresses in the same year and if they are born between 
2 and 240 days of each other. That is, we allow students to be born on the same or 
consecutive days to account for twins. If at least one of these holds, the students cannot 
be siblings. This step produces a dummy variable for each student within the temporary 
family that equals 1 whenever another student within the temporary family is a potential 
sibling, and zero otherwise. Table B2 shows a simple scenario for a tentative family with 
three students where all three can be siblings to one another. In such cases, we assign the 
temporary family a permanent household identifier.  
Table B2  Table B3 
Student Student1 Student2 Student3  Student Student1 Student2 Student3 
1 1 1 1  1 1 1 0 
2 1 1 1  2 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1  3 0 1 1 
 
3. Table B3 shows a tentative family where not all students can be siblings to one another: 
student 1 could be a sibling to student 2 but not to student 3, while student 2 could be a 
sibling to both students 1 and 3. Based on the indices, we conclude there are two potential 
true sibling groups: either students 1 and 2 are siblings, or students 2 and 3 are siblings. 
For each potential sibling group, we calculate a score based on the number of years 
students live together, the number of students in the subgroup, and the span of years for 
which the students are observed. Specifically:  
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑔 =  







where i and j denote students in subgroup g, and y denotes year. 𝕀𝑗≠𝑖,𝑦  equals 1 if student 
i and student j are observed living together in year y. ∑ ∑ 𝕀𝑗≠𝑖,𝑦𝑖,𝑗∊𝑔𝑦  equals the number of 
times students in the subgroup live with each other, allowing for double counting. 
𝑁𝑔 denotes the number of students in subgroup g. Ny the is the difference between the 
first and last year subgroup g is observed. For example, if a subgroup is first observed 
living together in 2000 and last observed in 2005, Ny equals 5. The first term of the index 
gives more weight to subgroups where students are observed living together more often 
per student. The second term gives more weight to subgroups observed living together in 
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consecutive years as opposed to many years apart. The subgroup with the highest score is 
assigned a permanent family identifier, and the step is repeated until all students in the 
temporary family are assigned a family identifier.  
Table B4 shows the distribution of children across family size produced by our algorithm. 
Almost half of the children have only one sibling (columns 2 and 3), and about 84 percent of 
families have at most two children (column 5). Dividing the total number of children by the total 
number of families gives an average number of children per family of 1.80, which is similar to 
the figure provided by the Census.  
Table B4: Distribution of children across family size 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Family size # of children % of children # of families % of families 
1        457,796  21.56%        457,796  38.97% 
2     1,054,842  49.68%        527,421  44.90% 
3        458,760  21.61%        152,920  13.02% 
4        127,036  5.98%          31,759  2.70% 
5          19,960  0.94%            3,992  0.34% 
6            3,798  0.18%               633  0.05% 
7               791  0.04%               113  0.01% 
8               144  0.01%                 18  0.00% 
9                 45  0.00%                   5  0.00% 
Total      2,123,172  100%     1,174,657  100% 
 
 
B3. Sample Selection and Variable Construction 
In describing the sample, we refer to the year of the spring semester (e.g., 2000 refers to 
academic year 1999-2000).   
Sample selection criteria: The raw data include all children who attended public school, 
including charter schools, between 1997 and 2017. Because our blood lead level data begin in 
1992 and children are tested up to age 6, we only have blood lead level data for children born 
after 1986. Thus, we restrict the sample to children born after 1986. Since the raw birth year data 
have some error, we impute birth year based on year and grade, and assume students enter first 
grade by age 7.23 Our full sample includes 3.3 million children with non-missing student 
identifier, and is described in Column 1 of Table 1 in the main text. All these children are used to 
 
23 Our results are robust to using birth year or other ages instead. 
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calculate standardized test scores, cohort and class size, as well as the percentages of EBLLs, ED 
students, and non-White students by cohort.  
 In our analyses, we restrict the sample to children for whom we have, at minimum, 
information on birthday, grade, and school attended in a given year, as well as at least one of the 
outcomes of interest (except for column 1 if Table 1 in which we include all children). We also 
impose several sample restrictions on our outcome variables (described below) which result in 
fewer unique student observations in our analyses samples. Using the family identifier 
constructed using our sibling matching algorithm described in Data Appendix B2, we further 
restrict our main analysis sample to siblings. Our main analysis sample has 1.3 million children 
and is described in Column 2 of Table 1.  
The final sample for our short-run analysis is a panel with unique student observations at 
the grade and year level. For our long-run analysis, we further collapse the data to one 
observation per student by averaging all covariates over grades 3-8.   
 
 
Lead exposure definition: Capillary tests are more prone to false positives than venous 
tests. Thus, to identify lead poisoned children we use the highest venous test result if available, 
and the highest capillary test result if no venous test was performed. 
Our main explanatory variable is the share of peers that have elevated blood lead levels. 
We construct two measures of peer exposure, one at the cohort---that is school-grade-year level,-
--and one at the classroom level. The share of cohort peers that have elevated blood lead levels 
equals the number of cohort peers that have known EBLL, divided by the number of children in 
the cohort (excluding oneself). NCERDC provides data on classroom membership from 2006-
2017 for all grades. We define a classroom at the school-year-term-teacher-course code level. To 
calculate classroom peer exposure, we first calculate the share of peers that are lead-exposed in 
each classroom, where a classroom is defined at the school-year-term-teacher-course code level. 
We then calculate the share of lead poisoned classroom peers by taking the average over all 
classrooms a student is in.   
Test scores: NCERDC provides data on end-of-grade (EOG) mathematics and reading 
test scores for grades 3 through 8 between 1997 and 2017. When a student has more than one 
math or reading EOG score within a school-grade, we take the highest score. We standardize 
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math and reading test scores at the grade-year level, using the full sample of children with non-
missing test scores. We then average the two to obtain our average test score outcome variable. 
When one either the mathematics or reading test score is missing, we retain the non-missing test 
score. 
North Carolina changed the EOG exams and exam scales multiple times during the 
sample period. The scale for the math EOG exams changed in 2002, 2006, and 2013. The 
reading EOG exam scale changed 2003, 2007, and 2013. In addition, North Carolina started 
offering alternative assessment exams in 2006. Prior to 2006, all students took the same exam. 
Changes to the exams’ scale, grading difficulty and accommodation may have shifted the 
distribution of test scores across schools in ways that were correlated with peer quality. For 
example, teachers in schools with more lead poisoned peers may have changed their teaching or 
grading of exams once the exam difficulty changed in order to meet proficiency thresholds. 
Schools not meeting proficiency standards were also marked for targeted interventions over this 
time period. It could also be that there was non-random selection of students allowed to take the 
regular exam after 2005. For these reasons, we focus on exams administered up to and including 
2005. Since the mathematics and reading scale changed during this time period, we include 
indicators for the testing regime in our regressions.  
Suspensions: Data on suspensions are available beginning in 2001. We have information 
on in and out-of-school suspensions, length of out-of-school suspensions, number of 
suspensions, and expulsions. Reporting requirements changed in 2009, which resulted in more 
in-school suspensions and other previously non-reportable incidents to be reported. Reporting for 
out-of-school suspensions did not change, so in our analysis we focus on out-of-school 
suspensions (OOS). We create an OOS suspension indicator that equals one if a student had at 
least one OOS suspension during the academic year. We calculate days spent in OOS 
suspensions over the academic year by summing over all OOS suspensions in that year. If an 
OOS suspension is longer than 365 days, we set the length to 365 days.  
In all analyses, we limit suspensions to grades 6-12 as suspensions in elementary grades 
are unlikely. We also drop 2005 from these analyses because the 2005 suspension file does not 
have a unique student identifier and we cannot link it with other data. We perform two additional 
sample restrictions to minimize measurement error from reporting. One, for each school we 
calculate cumulative OOS suspensions over time and drop school-year observations if the 
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cumulative sum is zero. In other words, we drop schools in years where no student was 
suspended, as long as that year precedes the first year with positive school-level OOS 
suspensions. Two, we drop school years with implausibly low suspension rates based on the size 
of the student body and patterns in the same grades at other schools.   
School absences: NCERDC provides data on the number of days a student was absent 
from school in a given year. These data are available for years 1997-2000 and 2004-2017. At the 
beginning of our sample, absences are reported in four bins---0-7, 8-14, 15-21, and more than 21 
days absent---and we follow this breakdown throughout the sample. We create an indicator for 
whether a student is absent from school more than 21 days. Following the sample restrictions we 
impose for OOS suspensions above, we limit absences to grades 6-12 and to school-years where 
absences are consistently reported.  
Same-day OOS suspension and incidents with cohort peer with EBLL: The suspension 
data provide information on the exact date the suspension occurred, as well as an incident 
identifier (ID). OOS suspension dates are available from 2001, and incident ID is available from 
2004. Both OOS suspension dates and incident ID are missing for 2005-2007. We create a yearly 
indicator that equals one if a non-poisoned student is suspended OOS on the same day as a lead 
poisoned cohort peer. Similarly, using the incident ID, we create an indicator for whether a non-
poisoned student is involved in the same behavioral incident as a lead poisoned peer each year. 
We follow the same sample restrictions applied to OOS suspensions. 
Same-day OOS suspension and incidents with classroom peer with EBLL: We combine 
the classroom membership data with the OOS suspension and incident ID data to create 
indicators for being suspended out of school on the same day as a lead poisoned classroom peer, 
and for being involved in the same behavioral incident as a lead poisoned classroom peer. We 
apply the sample restrictions described for OOS suspensions.  
 
Our long-run outcomes are defined only for students who are old enough to reach grade 
11 during our sample period, i.e., students born before 1999.  
 
High school graduation: Graduation status is available for students in grade 12 for the 
entire sample period. Our indicator for having graduated high school equals one if a student has 
ever earned one of the following diplomas: career preparation, college technical preparation, 
62 
college/university preparation, occupational course of study, vocation, or general diploma. 
NCERDC provides data on graduations and school exit, which complement our data on high 
school diplomas earned. Students who have obtained a certificate of achievement, graduation 
certification, or no diploma are not considered high school graduates. 
School drop-out: Dropout information is available for the entire sample period, and we 
use it to create and indicator for having ever dropped out of school. All school systems in North 
Carolina define a dropout as 
“an individual who was enrolled in school at some time during the reporting year, who 
was not enrolled on day 20 of the current year, and has not graduated from high school or 
completed a state or district approved educational program.  Students who transferred to another 
public school district, private school, or home school are not considered dropouts.  Students who 
are temporarily absent due to suspension or illness are not considered dropouts.  School leavers 
whose status is unknown must be included in the total count of dropouts for that year. In 1998, 
the State Board of Education approved changes to the definition of dropouts. Students who leave 
high school for a community college GED, adult high school, or other program are considered 
dropouts.” 
College intentions: NCERDC provides information on post-high school graduation 
plans, and actual and intended course of study while in school. Post-graduation intentions are 
available from 2009, and intended course of study is available from 1998-2005. We define 
having 4-year college intentions if a student plans on attending a 4-year institution, or attends/ 
intends to take college prep courses. A student has 2-year college intentions if they plan on 
attending community or technical college, a trade, business or nursing school, or attend/intend to 
take college tech prep, occupational or vocational courses.  
SAT taking: Data on SAT taking by high school students are available from 2009. Our 
indicator for having taken the SAT equals one if a student has either math or verbal SAT score. 
When we don’t observe either a math or verbal SAT score, we assume the student did not take 
the SATs while in high school.  
 
